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ABSTRACT: Sport mega-events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, or on a 
smaller  scale  the  Commonwealth  Games  or  regional  events,  attract  competing  bids  from 
nations or cities.  These bids are mostly made at tax-payers‟ expense and spending is often 
large and non-transparent.  Our paper addresses the question of why large sums of public 
money are spent in an attempt to secure uncertain rights to host events which, according to ex 
post studies, often yield few gains.  The paper analyses the economics of the bidding process, 
emphasising  public  choice  aspects  of  mega-event  bidding  to  identify  the  interaction  of 
potential beneficiaries and policymakers‟ interests.  We do not directly enter debates about 
legacies of hosting mega-events, but ask why public money is spent on a bidding process 
which is even less likely to realize net social benefits.   The empirical part of the paper uses 
past bids from the state of South Australia, a  demonstrated  bidder for various sports mega 
(or not so mega-) events with a mixed record of success, as a case study of the economics of 
bidding. 
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BIDDING FOR SPORT MEGA-EVENTS 
 
Sport mega-events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, or on a smaller scale 
the Commonwealth Games or regional events, attract competing bids from nations or cities.  
These bids are mostly made at tax-payers‟ expense and spending is often large and non-
transparent.  The benefits from bidding are equal to the net benefits from hosting the event 
multiplied by the probability of a successful  bid, minus  the cost  of the bidding process.   
Losing bids incur costs for little if any ex post benefit.
1  Moreover, even a successful bid may 
yield little social benefit: ex post cost-benefit analyses of sporting mega-events suggest that 
the net gains to the host community are often negligible or negative.  This paper analyses the 
economics  of  the  bidding  process,  addressing  the  question  of  why  large  sums  of  public 
money are spent in an attempt to secure uncertain rights to host events which yield few, if 
any, economic benefits.
2   Several examples are presented and we pay particular attention to 
the  public choice aspects of the phenomenon of mega-event bidding.     
The popular and academic literature is centred on bidding for the Olympic Games and 
for the FIFA World Cup.  This literature provides contextual background, because attitudes to 
sports  mega-events  are  largely  driven  by  these  two  high  profile  quadrennial  events.  
However, the difficulty of predicting the winners of contested bids limits the value of these 
two events for shedding light on the wider phenomenon of why cities or countries spend 
resources on bids for sports mega-events. Instead of focusing on bids for a mega-event, an 
alternative approach is to examine a bidder‟s behaviour over a range of mega-events.  The  
final part of the paper uses past bids from the state of South Australia, a serial bidder for 
various sports mega (or not so mega-) events with a mixed record of success, as a case study 
of the economics of the bidding phenomenon.  Despite a series of ex post studies showing 
that past events have yielded minimal social benefits and in at least one case overblown net 
costs, the state government continues to fund, directly and indirectly, bids for future sport 
mega-events. 
We  begin  by  presenting  a  basic  model  which  captures  the  interaction  between 
governments and special interest groups in the determination of equilibrium bids.  Our aim is 
to formalise some of the issues, without addressing more problematic aspects such as the 
interaction with and decision making process of the body with power to award the event to a 
                                                       
1 They may play a signalling function and reduce the cost of a subsequent bid, but that still does not explain why 
bidders incur a cost in order to enter the process. 
2 Dwyer et al. (2006) review the literature on the economic impact of mega-events, emphasising that studies 
finding net benefits are methodologically flawed because they ignore general equilibrium implications.   3 
particular  location,  or  competitive  behaviour  between  rival  nations/cities.
3    The  second 
section reviews the, largely descriptive, literature on bidding for sports events.  The third 
section reports  the history of mega-event bidding and some case studies from the State of 
South Australia, emphasising dynamic elements such as learning and the creation of vested 
interests which influence future bidding behaviour.  The theoretical model and the empirical 
analysis  suggest  that  understanding  of  the  bidding  process  requires  a  political  economy 
(public choice)  approach, and that large gaps remain in our understanding of the political 
process under which bids are made.   In the conclusions we discuss the role of transparency 
and issues such as the role of public beliefs as to benefits and costs of proposed events. 
 
1.  The Model 
 
To illustrate the potential role of lobbying in the sports bidding process, we present a model 
based  on  the  common-agency  framework  of  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994)  in  order  to 
explain the size of a bid (B) .  We assume that there are three groups in society: a single 
lobby group which benefits from the bidding process, the public, and the government.
4  The 
ex ante estimates of the returns from hosting the event (R) are accepted as true by all parties 
in the model.    
The lobby group makes political contributions (S(B)) to the government, which are 
contingent on the level of the bid made (S>0, S<0).   The group is a direct beneficiary from 
the bidding process.  Benefits could include profits derived from marketing activities, pre-
hosting construction (as part of a bid), benefits to a particular sporting association, etc.  In 
other words, we wish to keep the notion of a third party which yields some private benefit 
from bidding for mega-events as broad as possible.  In addition, should the event be won, it is 
logical to assume that the lobby would also gain some additional benefit. Denote the returns 
extracted  by  the  lobby  from  the  bidding  process  as  (B),  with  >0,  <0,  where 
      1, B B R        .   The first term captures the direct benefits from the bid and 
the  second  the  share  of  the  estimated  gains  which  accrue  from  hosting  an  event.    The 
                                                       
3 For some mega-events a preliminary competition determines which city will be the national bidder, while for 
other events cities bid directly in a single stage.  When governments make the case for a bid, there tends to be 
little discussion of rival behaviour.  Moreover, nations with seemingly little chance of success often bid against 
more likely candidates, e.g. the bids to host the 2018 Football World Cup by Indonesia and by Qatar in 2022, 
where playing temperatures are likely to exceed 40 degrees. 
4 We ignore competition between rival lobby groups.  The specification here implicitly assumes that there is one 
lobbying citizen and one public person.  This assumption is made for simplicity without changing the intuition 
behind the results which follow.   4 
parameter  captures the proportion of this benefit which, in the event of a successful bid, 
falls to the general public (   0,1   ). 
The public are assumed to bear the full cost of any bidding (B) which takes place.  
The probability of winning the event is denoted (B,), where (B)>0, (B)<0, (B=0)=0, 
()>0,  ()<0,  (0,1).   A larger bid increases the probability of success, but with 
diminishing  marginal  returns.
5  The  probability  of  success  also  turns  on  the  exogenous 
parameter  which captures characteristics of the potential host at the time of bidding.
6  The 
utility of the lobby and the public can thus be expressed as: 
   
 
                            (1)
,                          (2)
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Where (0,1) is the proportion of exogenous returns to hosting the event captured by the 
public.  The costs associated with the bid (B) are fully borne by the public, which assumes 
that the contribution of the lobby group to the cost of the bid is zero. 
The government‟s utility is a weighted sum of contributions received from the lobby 
group and aggregate welfare (W) associated with the bid.   
   
G U S B W B            (3) 
Consistent  with  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994),  we  assume  that  the  relative  weight  (θ) 
ascribed to aggregate welfare vis à vis contributions is determined exogenously.  Aggregate 
welfare is the sum of all agents' utility.  Contributions made by the lobby group are received 
by government and cancel out in aggregate.  Hence, aggregate welfare is specified as:  
    , W B B R B             (3a) 
 
1.1 Equilibrium Conditions 
 
The lobby group  makes contributions which are contingent on the level of B chosen.  With 
both this and aggregate welfare in mind, the government chooses B.  The conditions for an 
                                                       
5 Note, however, that if the potential host does not make a bid, it has no chance of success.  Put differently, it is 
evident that hosting rights are not awarded on the basis of  alone.  Obviously, there is a likely interaction 
between attributes and the bid which is discussed below. 
6 Such characteristics might include, political stability, enforcement of law and order, location and attractiveness 
to fans.  Examples are Brazil's status in soccer (a high  for its 2014 World Cup bid) and hooliganism (reducing 
 for England's 2018 World Cup bid)    While some of these factors change over time, we consider them fixed 
at the point in time in which a bid is made. 
   5 
equilibrium of this  type of menu-auction  game are set  down in  Bernheim and Whinston 
(1986): 
      * Arg max  
G B U B S B W B          (BW1) 
    * Arg max  
LG B U B U B        (BW2) 
(BW1)  indicates  that  the  equilibrium  bid  (B)  is  chosen  to  maximise  a  weighted  sum  of 
contributions from the lobby group and aggregate welfare, while condition (BW2) requires 
that joint welfare of the lobby and the government is maximised.  From equations (1) and (3): 
  BW1:  0
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and 
  BW2:  0
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    (4c) 
Equations (4a-4c) imply that around the equilibrium point, contributions will be offered such 
that the marginal cost of changing policy is equated to the marginal benefit of such a change. 
Such contributions are coined by Grossman and Helpman as „locally truthful‟.    
 
1.2 The Government's Decision on the Size of the Bid 
 
By substituting (4c) into the right hand side of the government‟s first order condition in (4a), 








              (4d) 
Using (1) and (3), the associated first order condition is: 
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    (5) 
Totally differentiating (5) and performing the relevant calculations yields the following 
results:
7 
                                                       
7 Proofs of all results appear in the Appendix.   6 
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The size of the bid will increase with the estimated returns (R) from holding an event.  
While the uncertainty of the estimate of R is not modelled here, the result highlights the 
importance of ex ante versus ex post estimates of benefit.  A well known result from the 
sports economics literature is that the gains realised after an event is held are often found to 
be well short of initial estimates.  This provides a potential feedback insofar as potential 
beneficiaries from a bid have an incentive to promote a high ex ante estimate of R.  
While government is willing to spend more on the bid when these gains are high, the 
effect is tempered by a high value for .  In R1 the term   1    is unambiguously positive 
and decreasing in the parameter .  Hence,  if the gains from winning the event fall less to the 
lobby, the government response to an increase in estimated benefits will be more muted.  
Direct support for this result  is provided in R2, in which the level of the bid falls with the 
parameter .  Again, a lower share of the spoils for the lobby, which as shown receives a 
higher  weight  than  the  general  public  in  government  decision  making,  implies  the 
government is less willing to spend on a bid.  The signs of (R3) and (R4) are dependent on 
the values of certain parameters and assumptions in the model.    If the marginal effect of bids 
rises with attributes, then the sign of R3 is positive.  Intuitively, as exogenous attributes 
become more favourable, this increases the effectiveness of bidding, and the effect is greater 
when R is large.  Conversely, if bid spending and attributes are substitutes, then the sign of 
R3 is negative.  The sign of (R4) depends on the gains relative to the costs of bidding.  Where   7 
the gains are large, an increase in regard for aggregate welfare will lead to a higher bid.
8  If 
costs are high, an increase with regard to public welfare leads to a lower bid. 
 
1.3 Contributions from the Lobby Group 
 
The lobby group chooses contributions to maximise its utility in (1).  The first order condition 
is: 
    1 1 0
L U B B
R
S B S B S


    
    
    
        (6) 
In equilibrium, the lobby will chose contributions to equate the marginal cost of a political 
donation with the marginal expected gains it receives from both the bidding process and its 
share of the hosting benefits.
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Result R5 indicates that equilibrium contributions to the government will tend to be 
lower when the share of hosting benefits which accrue to the public (instead of the lobby) are 
high.  Intuitively, when the benefits which accrue to the lobby from winning the right to host 
are small, the marginal benefits of lobbying for a bid are eroded.  The sign of R6 depends on 
the effect attributes have on the marginal product of bidding.  Where attributes strengthen the 
                                                       
8 However, note that the gains could be toward either the lobby or the public, with the effect holding even if the 
latter group receives little.  One possibility is that  1. B    Evidence suggests that bids are often partially 
spent on travel for overseas delegates, etc.  However, note that even with such an assumption,  the stronger the 
effect of a bid on the lobby group‟s profits, ceteris paribus the exogenous gains (R) can be lower. 
9 With monetary contributions the marginal cost of a political contribution is equal to unity. 
10 All proofs appear in the Appendix.   8 
effect of bids on winning hosting rights, the lobby is more prepared to make contributions.  
Intuitively, as the chances of success are greater due to the exogenous characteristics, it is 
more worthwhile to lobby for a bid to be made.   Result R7 reveals that higher estimated 
gains (R) will induce greater lobbying effort to induce the government to bid more.  This 
arises due to two factors.  First, the government will suffer a lower political loss when R is 
high (aggregate welfare will be expected to increase in the event that a bid is successful), and 
hence less contributions are required to influence the government.  Second, as the lobby is a 
direct beneficiary to these estimated returns, it has a stronger incentive to lobby for a bid to 
be made.   
Note that the magnitudes of expressions (R6) and (R7) fall when the proportion of the 
estimated  benefits  which  will  accrue  to  the  public  is  higher.    In  the  limit,  where  =1, 
0 dS
dR  .  Such a case does not imply that no lobbying for a bid takes place,  however in the 
limiting case contributions will turn only on the direct effect on the lobby‟s profits through .   
If all of the gains from actually hosting the event fall to the general public, the lobby group 
will not have a regard for the chances of success arising from the bid itself; the sole gain to 




Taken together, the results indicate that lobbying efforts and bidding will be unambiguously 
higher  where  the  estimated  gains  (R),  the  proportion  of  the  gains  accruing  to  special 
interests(1-), or the direct benefits accruing to the lobby from the bid ( B   ) are greater.  
This is unsurprising given that each raises the potential benefits for the lobby group and 
hence induces it to make contributions.  Such contributions are only made contingent on the 
government making a higher bid. However, the results bring several issues relating to mega-
event bidding into new light.   
First, and perhaps most pronounced, is the effect of estimated gains from holding the 
event.    We  assume  that  the  estimate  of  gains  is  taken  as  given,  but  it  has  been  well 
documented that ex post estimations of benefits from events such as the Olympics tend to be 
much lower than a priori ones.  This is a problem which is now gaining increased recognition 
in the media, however, what has been largely ignored is that overstated benefits may have the 
effect of increasing both the quantity and efficacy of special interest group lobbying.  We also 
note that, although not modelled here, special interest groups tend to strongly advocate the   9 
„large‟ gains which are likely to accrue from hosting mega-events.  This type of lobbying of 
the  public  acts  as  a  complement  to  its  direct  lobbying  of  the  government.    Similarly, 
governments may also have an incentive to overstate estimated public benefits in order to 
lower the political costs of catering to lobbying demands (and perpetuating the payment of 
political contributions). 
Our results suggest that interactions between lobby groups and government can lead 
to a bid which is not in the public interest.  Bidding will be greater where the direct gains to 
lobby groups from the process itself are higher and when the lobby group receives a larger 
share of the benefits from actually hosting the event.  The diversion of tax revenue to lobby 
groups (i.e. the direct gains) and the accrual to those groups of a larger share of the benefits 
from a successful bid may be in politicians' interests rather than the interests of the public, 
and  both  government  and  the  lobby  group  may  prefer  to  obfuscate  how  B  and  R  are 
distributed.     
As  will  be  shown  below,  information  relating  to  how  bids  are  spent  is  often  not 
readily available to the public.  The results bring into question the role of the decision making 
process  of  the  governing  bodies  making  decisions  over  hosting  rights.    At  very  least,  a 
strengthening  of  public  disclosure  rules  about  how  bid  money  is  spent  appears  to  be 
warranted.    Moreover,  both  groups  may  have  a  strong  incentive  to  overstate  the  gains 
associated with hosting an event. Hence, public information which reveals the manner in 
which  bids  are  spent  has  the  capacity  to  increase  public  awareness  as  to  potential 
beneficiaries from the process (which might limit the credibility of these groups' claims as to 





Many sporting events have a natural monopoly element due to the quest to know the true 
champion.  In many sports this was driven initially by an amateur spirit, embodied in the 
Olympic  Games  or  in  Wimbledon  in  tennis,  where  professionals  were  not  allowed  to 
compete.  Gradually such mega-events became professionalized and commercialized.  This 
section  reviews  the  background  in  the  context  of  bidding  to  host  mega-events.    For  the 
Olympic Games, 1986 marked a dividing line when competitive bidding and emphasis on 
commercial  success  became  more  pronounced.    The  1990s  saw  increasing  belief  in  the 
economic, as opposed to more narrowly sporting, benefits of hosting mega-events, which   10 
encouraged countries, provinces and cities to compete to host a wide range of sporting and 
other events. For the soccer World Cup, the 2000 vote on bids to host the 2006 event was a 
watershed.  For both the IOC and FIFA, the turn of the century saw bad publicity about lack 
of transparency and potential for corruption in the bidding process.   
The Olympic Games is a benchmark for sporting mega-events, and likely to have 
lessons for the bidding process for other mega-events.  Federsen, Maennig and Zimmermann 
(2007 – henceforth FMZ) divide the history of Olympics bidding into five phases, and argue 
that competitive bidding only characterized the last two phases (i.e. since the selection in 
1986 of Barcelona to host the 1992 Games).  The taxonomic section of their paper is valuable 
in setting out the global context of attitudes towards hosting sporting mega-events.  In Phase 
1, from 1896 to World War II, the Olympic Games were held in Western Europe or the USA, 
with  little  competitive  bidding.    In  Phase  2  the  number  of  bids  began  to  increase,  and 
locations became more global with Melbourne 1956, Tokyo 1964 and Mexico 1968.  At the 
same time, however, the Games became more  politicized.  In Phase 3 fewer cities were 
interested in bidding: Munich, Madrid, Montreal and Detroit for 1972, Montreal, Los Angeles 
and Moscow for 1976, Moscow and Los Angeles for 1980, and Los Angeles for 1984.  In 
contrast to the financial disaster of Montreal 1976, the LA 1984 Games, and to a lesser extent 
Seoul 1988 were considered financially successful, and ushered in the post-1986 era of more 
competitive bidding.  FMZ divide this period into two phases separated by the 2001 scandal 
surrounding bidding for the 2008 Winter Olympics.  The bidding process was reformed to 
make  it  more  transparent  for  the  2008  Olympics.    Nevertheless,  transparency  does  not 
guarantee predictability; up until the moment that the decision on 2012 was announced Paris 
was planning a celebration party, but London‟s bid was successful. 
FMZ  analyse  the  bids  for  the  six  Olympics  from  1992  to  2012  to  determine 
characteristics of success.  Most variables, including all national economic variables, are not 
significant, and even in the statistically most satisfactory specification (panel logit with fixed 
effects) only three variables (distance from venues to the Olympic village, number of beds 
within fifty minutes‟ travel time, and average temperature) have coefficients significantly 
different from zero at the ten percent level, and R-squareds are low.  Only two out of six 
successful bids are predicted by any model, although FMZ find comfort in their models‟ 
ability to predict unsuccessful bids accurately.  However, many of the failures are no-brainers   11 
– no serious model should predict that Havana‟s two bids would succeed.
11  The conclusion 
appears to be that the necessary conditions for a successful bid are relatively easy to identify, 
but sufficient conditions are not. 
A separate Winter Olympics dates from 1924,
12 and until 1992 they were held in the 
same year as the Summer Olympics, but with fewer feasible host countries.
13  After 1992 
they split from the Summer Olympics and have been held on alternating even years. The rise 
of television greatly enhanced the profile of the Winter Games and created a lucrative income 
stream, which has been associated with more competitive bidding and a major corruption 
scandal. 
Salt Lake City bid for the 1998 Winter Olympics, but lost the IOC vote to Nagano 
(Japan).  This may have been because the USA had won the 1996 Summer Olympics, but the 
Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC) thought that Nagano had spent more on wooing the 
IOC voters.
14  When Salt Lake City bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics, they spent millions of 
dollars on perks including ski trips, scholarships, Super Bowl trips, plastic surgery, real estate 
deals for  IOC members and jobs for their family members.  In 1995 the IOC announced Salt 
Lake City the winning bidder. Scandal broke in December 1998, when Swiss IOC member 
Marc Hodler announced that several members of the IOC had taken bribes.  Before any of the 
four independent investigations (by the IOC, the USOC, the SLOC, and the United States 
Department of Justice) could get under way, the two heads of the SLOC resigned.  The 
Department of Justice filed fifteen charges of bribery and fraud against the two, although 
both were eventually acquitted of all criminal charges in December 2003.  Although no laws 
had been broken, as a result of the IOC investigation, ten members of the IOC were expelled 
and  another  ten  were  sanctioned  -  the  first  expulsion  or  sanction  for  corruption  in  IOC 
history.  Stricter rules about acceptance of gifts and ceilings on how much IOC members 
could accept from bid cities were put in place for future bids. 
                                                       
11 There is a large literature, much of it non-rigorous consultancy reports, on the anatomy of a successful bid in 
terms of marketing, bid-team composition and so forth, captured in Westerbeek et al. (2002) and reviewed in the 
South African context by Swart and Bob (2004) 
12 Figure skating and ice hockey were Olympic events before 1924, but the larger program hosted by France in 
1924 was so successful that the IOC in 1925 retroactively labelled it the Winter Olympics and subsequently 
solicited separate bids to host the Winter Olympics. 
13 The 1928 Olympics were hosted by Amsterdam, which was not a good location for downhill skiing, and the 
Winter Olympics were held in St. Moritz, Switzerland.  The United States has hosted the Winter Olympics four 
times, France three times, Italy, Japan, Norway and Austria twice, and Canada once.  Vancouver, Canada, will 
be the 2010 host and Sochi, Russia, in 2014. 
14 Many years later, a 2006 report to the Nagano region's governor said that the city provided millions of dollars 
in  an  “illegitimate  and  excessive  level  of  hospitality”  to  IOC  members,  including  $4.4  million  spent  on 
entertainment alone.   12 
The other top mega-event, the FIFA World Cup, has historically involved less active 
bidding due to the intermediary role for the continental associations and agreements on inter-
continental  rotation.
15  The  1974-86  WCs  were  uncontested,  although  the  withdrawal  of 
Colombia from 1986 led to an election, now conducted by the FIFA Executive Committee, 
which Mexico won.  In other years a simple majority decided the bidding in a single round, 
with fairly uncontroversial outcomes.  In 2002 faced with competing bids from Japan and 
Korea to be the first Asian hosts, FIFA brokered a deal for the two to be co-hosts.  Bidding 
was more competitive for the 2006 WC, with three rounds of voting before Germany just 
edging  out  South  Africa  in  controversial  circumstances.  Allegations  of  corruption  in  the 
bidding, which took place in 2000 (i.e. just over a year after the Salt Lake scandal broke), 
highlighted the lack of transparency in bidding for mega-events.
16  The German bid also 
illustrated the difficulty of measuring the cost of a bid, as among other initiatives Bayern 
Munich played a series of exhibition games in Asia which showcased German soccer and 
may also have been financially advantageous to host national associations with votes on the 
WC bids.  South Africa could not compete with this bidding strategy, although the losing bid 
did pave the way for award of the 2010 WC.  With the 2014 WC rotating to South America, 
Brazil was a shoo-in given its stature in the sport and the 64-year lag since Brazil last hosted 
the WC (i.e. in the previous section's model Brazil had a high α).  Beyond 2014 explicit 
continental rotation has been abandoned and there is active competitive bidding for the 2018 
and 2022 events, whose location has not yet been decided. 
Maennig and du Plessis (2007) argue that to maximize revenues from sale of the right 
to host the WC, FIFA acts as a monopolist extracting much of the benefits from the host 
country.  FIFA retains TV and marketing rights and enforces conditions (e.g. only FIFA-
endorsed sponsors can advertise within 1km of stadiums or along major access routes) that 
increase the value of these rights.  In 2006 FIFA earned $2.4 billion from TV and marketing 
and $0.2 billion from sale of VIP tickets, and reported expenses of $704 million (for prize 
money, travel expenses and other costs), for a net gain of $1.9 billion.  Additional conditions, 
                                                       
15 Due to the length of travel time between Europe and South America, only four European countries entered the 
first WC in 1930 in Uruguay, and when both the 1934 and 1938 WCs were held in Europe Argentina and 
Uruguay boycotted the 1938 WC.  Brazil and Germany were the only bidders for the 1942 WC, but before a 
vote could be taken war broke out and the event was postponed until 1950, when it was played in Brazil by 
default.  In the 1950s FIFA adopted an informal policy of rotation between Europe and Latin America, which 
was extended to other continents when WCs were held in North America (1994) and East Asia (2002), and 
formalized in 2000 after the allocation of the 2006 WC. 
16 Germany won the third round by 12 votes to 11.  The Oceania delegate abstained, despite instructions from 
his region to support South Africa.  A 12-12 tie would have been broken by the vote of the FIFA President, 
Sepp Blatter, who had supported South Africa‟s bid.   13 
such as provision of offices with unlimited telephone and internet use for FIFA, catering, 
dedicated highway lanes for FIFA vehicles travelling to and from stadiums, etc. added to the 
economic profit or rent accruing to FIFA and its officials.  The German national organizing 
committee  made  an  after-tax  profit  of  $80  million,  mainly  deriving  from  ticket  sales  to 
capacity crowds, which was shared by the Bundesliga, the national soccer federation and the 
national  Olympics  committee.    This  profit  was  subsidized  by  substantial  public  sector 
expenditures, including $120 million for security, which alone outweighed the organizing 
committee‟s profit.  The $1.9 billion spent on stadium upgrading was 40% public-funded and 
Maennig and du Plessis (2007) report that a further $2.7 billion was spent by governments on 
WC-related infrastructure.
17 
Other professional team sports have organized world cup tournaments, but none is as 
lucrative as the soccer World Cup and there has been little competitive bidding to host the 
events.  The International Cricket Council's executive committee determined that England 
hosted the first three cricket World Cups (1975, 1979 and 1983) and the 1987 World Cup was 
jointly held in India and Pakistan, after which an unofficial rotation system was introduced.
18 
The rugby union World Cup, held every four years since 1987, has had a strict hemispherical 
rotation, although this is being challenged by Japan‟s bid to host the 2015 event. The rugby 
league World Cup, held thirteen times at irregular intervals since 1954 has seen no serious 
competition for hosting rights.
19  The 37 baseball World Cups since 1938 did not feature the 
leading players; until 1996 the competition was limited to amateur players and since 1996 
professional  minor  league  players  have  competed,  but  Major  League  Baseball  has  not 
allowed its players to participate. The World Baseball Classic, held in 2006 and 2009, was 
the first international baseball tournament to include players from the major leagues, but there 
is  no  competition  for  hosting  rights  because  matches  are  played  in  several  countries 
worldwide, although both finals were held in the USA. 
                                                       
17 The level of private spending on stadium upgrading seems to be exceptional.  For the 1974 WC in Germany 
all spending on stadiums was public and this seems to be the model for South Africa in 2010.  An extensive 
literature suggests that, on balance, spending on stadiums yields a low social return (Wilson and Pomfret, 2009). 
18 Australia and New Zealand hosted in 1992, India/Pakistan/Sri Lanka in 1996, England, Ireland, Netherlands 
and Scotland in 1999, South Africa in 2003 and the West Indies in 2007.  Despite Australia and New Zealand 
expecting to host the 2011 event it was allocated to South Asia – a decision which the Australian media ascribed 
to the increasing economic power and role of the Asian cricketing nations, particularly India - but allocation of 
the  2015  event  to  Australia  and  New  Zealand  and  the  2019  event  to  England  suggests  that  economic 
considerations have not become dominant, and bidding remains non-competitive. 
19 Only four countries (Australia, France, Great Britain and New Zealand) competed for the first six World 
Cups, to 1972, and from 1975-92 it was determined on a home and away basis, i.e. not really a mega-event.  The 
2000 event expanded entry to 16 countries, but was considered unsuccessful due to lack of competitive balance 
and the event was not held again until 2008.   14 
In  major  individual  sports,  tennis  and  golf  are  dominated  by  traditional  events, 
although there is competition to be in the circuit, while F1 fosters more open competition for 
rights to hold  a grand prix.  Some tournaments have retained their status and traditional 
location (e.g. the four Grand Slam tennis events or the Italian Grand Prix at Monza), but 
others have rotation within a country (e.g. British Open golf) or new locations.  Emphasis on 
economic factors has led to traditions being challenged, although the result was often a stand-
off.
20  The competition for a place on the circuit has been most extreme in F1, where, unlike 
tennis or golf, the Formula One World Championship is far more significant than individual 
GPs.  Countries are added or cut from the list of GPs and bids from competing cities for 
national GPs are accepted and appear to be driven by economic motives.
21  Is this because 
car-racing  is  competitive  (Indy,  F1,  Le  Mans,  and  other  formats)  or  because  F1  has  a 
structure with a centralized leadership even more personalized, under the control of Bernie 
Ecclestone and Max Mosley, than the IOC or FIFA?  The UCI pro-tour cycle circuit has 
some similar features, but on a much smaller commercial scale and correspondingly less 
aggressive profit-seeking. 
With the growing economic importance of sports and broader TV coverage, many 
minor spectator sports (e.g. equestrian events) or minor events of major sports (e.g. rugby 
sevens) have become sought after by host cities or countries.  The case study in the next 
section, Adelaide, a city of about a million people, illustrates this development.  Adelaide 
hosted the Australian F1 Grand Prix for ten years from its inaugural year 1985, but then lost 
the event to Melbourne, reflecting the difficulty of competing with larger cities for true mega-
events.    Adelaide  has  successfully  bid  to  be  a  sub-host  of  a  true  mega-event  (the  2000 
Olympics) and has unsuccessfully bid for a second-tier event (the Commonwealth Games), 
but it has been most active in bidding for a wide range of sporting events below this level.  
The state and city governments have dedicated offices for event attraction and management 
and substantial, but non-transparent, public funding has gone into bidding for events.
22 
                                                       
20 The strength of tradition is illustrated by  the  survival of Green Bay Packers despite other NFL owners' 
dissatisfaction with the existence of a small-town quasi publicly owned club in their league. When 20 leading 
clubs seceded from the Football League to form the FA Premier League, they were unable to drop the principle 
of promotion and relegation (which permitted small town teams to reach the PL while some big cities were 
unrepresented) and the structure of soccer in England and Wales remained unchanged (although the distribution 
of TV revenues did not). 
21 The 1950 F1 world championship consisted of eight GPs in Europe and one in the USA.  Since then the 
number has doubled, and events in Europe and the Americas have been dropped in favour of races in Asia and 
the Middle East - of the eighteen races in 2008, nine were held outside Europe.
  
22 State budgets have a single line item for winning and managing major events, which include musical festivals, 
food events, a rose festival, the Christmas pageant and other non-sporting events.  Funding for many events is 
through the budget of the South Australian Tourism Commission (SATC).  Adelaide city council covers a small   15 
 
3.  Adelaide 
 
South Australia and its capital city Adelaide have hosted a large number of events in recent 
decades, including a wide range of sporting events.  However, several of the more notable 
bidding  episodes  were  unsuccessful,  notably  failure  to  win  the  1998  and  2006 
Commonwealth Games and loss of the Australian F1 Grand Prix in 1995/6.  The state and 
city governments did not renounce sporting events, but adopted a range of strategies in order 
to be a host city.   
Efforts of the State to host the Commonwealth (previously Empire) Games date back 
to the mid 1950‟s, when Adelaide was the favourite to host the 1962 games, only to lose out 
to Perth.  Subsequent bids for the 1998 and 2006 games were also unsuccessful.  In all of 
these cases, the bidding process was a two stage one, with cities bidding at the national level 
before proceeding as the „Australian representative‟ against overseas competitors.   
The 1992 bid to host the 1998 Games was in the competitive post-LA-Olympics era, 
and both Adelaide and Kuala Lumpur lobbied hard for hosting rights.  Adelaide reportedly 
spent A$600,000 to be the representative bidder from Australia and a further A$4 million on 
the campaign, and had lined up an A$25 million government subsidy for the event itself.
23   
Official records from the South Australian Department of Recreation and Sport reveal that a 
total of $A4.1 million was allocated to the 1998 bid, exclusive of the sum spent on winning 
the stage one bid.
24  However, these figures only include salaries, administrative expenses, 
equipment, sundries, accommodation and service costs for the bidding office.  It seems likely 
that this excludes other consultancy fees (e.g. to marketing and transport companies).  In 
addition, at the beginning of the process, Cabinet approved the construction of a velodrome 
contingent on winning the right to be the Australian representative bidder for the 1998 games; 
while  this  facility  has  been  used  for  other  events,  the  Commonwealth  Games  bid  is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
part of the metropolitan area, and other councils fund events in their jurisdiction (e.g. Adelaide Hills council 
funding for the Lobethal vintage motor sports carnival). 
23 Details of the stage one bid taken from statements made from the Hon J K G Oswald MP, SA Parliamentary 
Debates, 1994-95, page 197.  The A$25 million figure is not easily ascertainable from SA Government records, 
and was reported in the media of Adelaide‟s main rival: “The Battle Hots Up; Millions of dollars are at stake in 
the bid to host the next Commonwealth Games. Will it be Kuala Lumpur or Adelaide?” Malaysian Business, 1-
15  July  1992,  p.32-3  www.i2media.com.my/gallery/articles/malaysian-business/1992-07-15-commonwealth-
games.pdf.  . 
24 Data from the Department of Recreation and Sport Annual Report 1989/90 through 1992/93.  The figures 
include a contribution of $A75k from the Adelaide City Council.   16 
implicated as the motivation for its completion at a cost of $A14.3 million.
25 Ultimately, 
Kuala Lumpur emerged as the winner of the bidding race for the event.
26 
Adelaide also tried to bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games, but lost the right to be 
the Australian bid city to Melbourne.
27   Documents relating to Adelaide‟s stage-one bid 
indicated a prospective estimate of A$3.45 million for its stage-two bid.  This comprised 
A$1.75  million  for  salaries,  A$250,000  for  the  establishment  of  the  bidding  office, 
A$195,000 for document preparation and legal expenses, A$375,000 for final preparation of 
the bid document, and a total of A$880,000 in travel expenses (Government of SA, 1996, 
page 14).  The last category included travel to and from Adelaide by bid representatives and 
Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) delegates and affiliates, even though some of this 
travel expense would have been explicitly against the constitution of the CGF: 
Despite  the  prohibitions  set  down  in  Article  29  and  the  byelaw  thereto  of  the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth Games Federation, it became necessary in  the 
course of the bid by Adelaide for the 1998 Commonwealth Games to host a visit of 
delegates representing all Commonwealth Games affiliates.  Should the bid for the 
2006  Commonwealth  Games  be  the  subject  of  keen  competition,  it  will  almost 
certainly  again  become  necessary  to  host  a  visit  from  Commonwealth  Games 
delegates (Government of SA, 1996, page 14). 
 
The bid documents made estimates of the costs and benefits of hosting the games, noting 
expected  costs  of  A$140  million  and  direct  benefits  from  TV  rights,  ticket  sales  and 
marketing  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  $A81  million.    These  numbers  appear  to  be 
understatements.    The capital  and operating costs  of the 2006 Commonwealth Games  in 
Melbourne were around $A1.1 billion
28 As for bidding costs, the government of Nova Scotia, 
                                                       
25 For details on the costs of the Velodrome‟s construction, see Department of Sport and Recreation, 1992, page 
11.  Details on the contingent nature of the approval by Cabinet can be found in Department of Sport and 
Recreation, 1990, page 19. 
26 Adelaide‟s 1992 bid for the 1998 Games was drawn into the Salt Lake corruption scandal controversy when 
Adelaide mayor Steve Condous claimed in 1999 that three countries‟ representatives (from Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
and an unnamed African country) had asked for incentives such as sponsoring children to study at the University 
of  Adelaide  in  return  for  votes.    He  reportedly  refused  to  comply  with  their  demands..    Reported  in  The 
Independent  (London)  20  January  2009;  http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/sports-politics-adelaide-refused-
bribery-demands-1075143.html 
27 Somewhat controversially, the Australian Commonwealth Games Association (ACGA) required significant 
guarantees from the State Government, and Premier Dean Brown noted that “The bottom line is that the ACGA 
has rejected bids from Adelaide and Perth because we were not prepared to write an open cheque in return for 
the right to stage the games” (The Advertiser, 9 August, 1996, page 11). Currently, the opposition party in South 
Australia is planning a bid for the 2018 Commonwealth Games, should it win power, while the governing party 
has  changed  tack,  with  the  Treasurer  labelling  the  bid  as  sub-optimal  use  of  public  money  and  the 
Commonwealth Games as a b-grade event   See http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/08/29/2350510.htm 
(11/6/09).  The Treasurer‟s remarks attracted media attention, particularly in India, where the games are to be 
hosted  in  2012,  and  his  comments  regarding  the  status  of  the  games  were  publicly  withdrawn 
(http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/09/03/2354038.htm, 11/6/09). 
28 Victoria government estimate at http://download.audit.vic.gov.au/files/afr2005-06_Com_Games_2006.pdf  - 
accessed 25 June, 2009.  Of the A$1.1 billion, the federal government contributed $121.9 in grants, $24.2   17 
which won the first-stage contest in Canada to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, had a 
C$14.3 million budget for their second-round bid.
29 
Adelaide has never bid to host the Olympics, but it hosted seven soccer matches in the 
Sydney  Olympics.    For  these  games,  the  Hindmarsh  Stadium  was  upgraded  to  increase 
capacity and improve facilities at a cost to state taxpayers of $24.5 million, an expenditure 
that was well over-budget and criticised in a subsequent official report (Wilson and Pomfret, 
2009). Adelaide is expecting to be a host city in the case of a successful Australian bid to host 
the 2018 or 2022 soccer World Cup, and the debate about public stadium funding is once 
again hotting up.  
Adelaide‟s major mega-event coup was in obtaining the right to host the Australian 
F1 Grand Prix when it was added to the Formula One World Championship in 1985.  The 
Australian event was the final race of the season and the Adelaide GP often provided high 
drama with the title being decided in 1986 and controversially in 1994.
30  More dramatically 
for Adelaide the race was moved to Melbourne in 1996, reflecting the difficulty of holding on 
to an annual mega-event once larger neighbours become interested. 
One  reaction  to  loss  of  the  F1  race  was  to  seek  alternative  motor  races.    The 
Australian leg of the then new Asia-Pacific Le Mans series was held in Adelaide over New 
Year‟s Eve 2000/1, but was an economic flop; despite a nine-year contract, the race was not 
held  again
31.  More  successful  has  been  the  V8 Supercar  race,  held  annually  since  1999, 
which  involves  indigenous  Ford  and  Holden  cars;  the  Adelaide  leg  of  this  national 
competition is known as the Clipsal 500.  The five-day Classic Adelaide Car Rally, held 
annually since 1997 is a race, but more of a showcase for vintage cars (and starting in 2009 
modern „exotics‟), as is the Lobethal Grand Carnival for cars and motorcycles which has 
been  run  on  the  1939  Australian  GP  and  TT  circuit  since  October  2008.    While  exact 
contributions are not readily disaggregated from Government records, these receive funding 
from the SA Motor Board, the South Australian Tourism Commission, and local councils. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
million in in-kind support and security costs of $79.1 million.  The SA government seemed to pay little attention 
to the Games‟ profitability; an assurance was made that should additional revenue be realised from TV rights or 
marketing, then these funds would be channelled back into the development of Commonwealth Games sports in 
Australia. 
29  http://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details.asp?id=20061130006  The  transparency  of  the  provincial  government 
website contrasts starkly with the secrecy surrounding SA expenditures. 
30 Michael Schumacher collided with rival Damon Hill to win the F1 championship. 
31 A controversy arose between Don Panoz, the owner of the Le Mans series and the SA government over when 
during the year to best hold the race after the initial staging. At that time it was also contemplated to combine 
the Le Mans series with the Clipsal 500 race to host a Motor Sport Festival over up to 9 days. The Auditor 
General‟s report for the SA Tourism Commission (2007, p 15 / 1201) states: “On 7 September 2006, a contested 
legal claim relating to the staging of the Le Mans event in Adelaide was settled and $1.87 million was written 
off in 2006-07. This was previously recognised as a provision for doubtful debts in 2005-06.”   18 
The „path dependence‟ in terms of Adelaide‟s reaction to the loss of the F1 Grand Prix 
was  mirrored  after  the  loss  of  the  1998  Commonwealth  Games  bid.    In  particular,  the 
Government set up the  International Events  Unit which was responsible for winning the 
rights to host events such as the World Cup Cycling, 2
nd World Canoe Polo Championship, 
World Masters Rowing Championship, and International Water Polo events.  Funding for this 
unit was provided by the State Government.  The experiences of South Australia indicate that 
there is a tendency to fall back to lesser events after a major event is lost or the bid for 
hosting is unsuccessful.  In part, this could be a function of the arguments relating to the 
economic importance of sports events that are often touted at the time of bidding.  Once lost, 
politicians have a propensity to find substitutes.  In some cases, such as those outlined below, 
this may be a relatively successful strategy. 
In 1997, the South Australian Tourism Commission began research into a major road 
cycling  race  for  Australia,  with  the  aim  of  creating  an  international  competition  in  the 
tradition of European classics such as the Tour de France, and in 1999 staged the six-day 
Sensational Adelaide Tour Down Under (TDU).  The TDU became an annual event, and in 
2008 it was included in the UCI circuit, the first UCI ProTour race to be held outside Europe.  
The South Australian Government has been active in securing and maintaining the Pro Tour 
status of the TDU. The 2006-07 State Budget provided an extra A$2 million over four years 
to expand the number of teams and increase the race‟s profile internationally.  The budget 
papers for 2008 to 2011 dedicate amounts of A$3.5 to 3.8 million per year for the Tour Down 
Under “to ensure that it continues to be a part of the Union Cycliste Internationale‟s ProTour 
circuit.” (SA Budget Statement 2008, page 46, section 2.26).  In 2009 the state funded Lance 
Armstrong personally to participate in the TDU.
32   The perceived benefits to the state are 
both economic and promotional. According to state Premier Mike Rann “The 2009 Tour 
Down Under has broken almost every record for a sporting event held in South Australia. …. 
The  2009  Tour  Down  Under  injected  a  massive  $39  million  into  the  South  Australian 
economy,  from  the  tens  of  thousands  of  visitors  who  travelled  here  from  interstate  and 
overseas. It was the biggest event we have ever staged.”
33    The Pro Tour was introduced in 
2005 and includes high-profile events such as the Tour de France and the Giro d‟Italia, some 
events iconic to bicycle insiders such as Paris–Roubaix, not so high-profile national tours 
such as the Tour de Pologne, the Tour de Suisse or the Deutschland Tour, and also regional 
                                                       
32 A payment of up to 2 million USD for Lance Armstrong to appear in the TDU is reported in  
http://www.crikey.com.au/Politics/20090212-Lance-Armstrong-3-million-and-the-silence-of-the-Rann.html . 
33 Reported at http://www.tourdownunder.com.au/2009/   19 
or even sponsor-specific events such as the Tour de Romandie in the French-speaking part of 
Switzerland, Vattenfall Cyclassics (sponsored by the electricity company Vattenfall Europe 
Hamburg) or the Amstel Gold Race.  All the grand tours (Tour de France, Giro d‟Italia and 
Vuelta a Espana) and single day events organised by Tour de France organiser  were delisted 
from the UCI Pro Tour list for 2008.  The Tour Down Under has been a Pro Tour event since 
2008.  The value of the Pro Tour status becomes increasingly questionable as the high-profile 
events drop off the lists due to arguments between the UCI and the organisers of the events
, 
while doping is another major reason why the status of the Pro Tour is under pressure
, with 
many teams deciding not to licence with the UCI Pro Tour at all. 
Since 1997 Adelaide has hosted an annual three-day equestrian event.   Originally 
known as the Adelaide International Horse Trials it was a CCI three star event.  In 1999 it 
was upgraded to four stars and in 2007 renamed The Australian International 3 Day Event.  
The AI3DE is Australia's premier equestrian competition, the only CCI four star event held in 
the southern hemisphere and one of only six held across the world.
34 As with the Tour Down 
Under, the strategy with the AI3DE was to build up an event reputation and then become a 
recognized leg of the international  circuit.  This  may have been possible in  these sports 
because the UCI and CCI were not managed with such an eye to profit as F1 or the Le Mans 
franchise. 
  Among  other  events  recently  hosted  in  Adelaide  are  the  Australian  leg  of  the 
International Rugby Board Sevens series (played in eight global locations),
 35 the 2007 World 
Police and Fire Games (a biennial event), Adelaide to Port Lincoln Yacht Race (an annual 
event held for the 59th. time in 2009), the World Solar Challenge, Australian Men‟s Hard 
Court Tennis Championship and the Great Australian Outback Cattle Drive.  
In sum, Adelaide has pursued a variety of strategies in bidding to host sports events.  
Part of the above narrative indicates path-dependence; for example, loss of the F1 GP led to a 
search  for  alternative  car  races.    There  are  a  variety  of  bidding  formats.    The  multiple 
                                                       
34 The  other  international  four  star  events  are,  the  Rolex  Kentucky  3  Day  Event  in  the  United  States,  the 
Burghley Horse Trials and Badminton Horse Trials in England, Luhmuhlen in Germany and Pau in France.  The 
Olympic Games and the World Equestrian Games, each held every four years are also classified Four Star level. 
35 Rugby Sevens is the small brother of Rugby, with only seven players for each side.  “The International Rugby 
Sevens Adelaide involves 16 international teams competing for points that go towards the International Rugby 
Board (IRB) Sevens series. Eight tournaments make up the IRB series, starting on Nov 28-29 in Dubai, and 
ending on 30-31 May in Edinburgh.” (http://www.adelaidesevens.com.au/sevens.rugby/page/66957). 
After hosting one of the eight stops of the International Rugby Sevens World Tour in 2009 it is apparently 
contemplated by SA politicians to host the 2013 Rugby Sevens World Cup. 
 -  http://www.news.com.au/adelaidenow/story/0,22606,25292829-5016659,00.html  (Adelaide  Now,  April  5, 
2009).  Rugby is not a popular sport in South Australia where Australian rules football is clearly dominant, and 
this explains the poor crowd numbers of fewer than 30.000 spectators over the three-day International Rugby 
Sevens World Tour event in 2009  in Adelaide.   20 
Commonwealth Games bids follow a standard Olympic-style bid with the twist of a two-
stage process: Adelaide has lost out both at the national first stage and in the international 
second stage.  At first sight these losing bids seem examples of a waste of public money, and 
yet the state repeatedly returns to the bidding table.  Less risky is to piggy-back on a bigger 
bid for a mega-event, such as hosting soccer games in the Sydney Olympics or participating 
in an Australian bid for the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup, even though there is no prospect of 
the  big  games  from  the  later  stages  being  held  in  Adelaide.    The  coup  of  hosting  the 
Australian  GP  illustrates  a  cost  of  hosting  a  perennial  event;  if  the  annual  “bid”  is 
insufficient,  the  event  may  be  lost,  especially  if  a  more  attractive  venue  appears  (i.e. 
Melbourne‟s α was larger than Adelaide‟s, at least in the eyes of the owners of the F1 brand).  
An  alternative  approach  is  to  identify  a  sport  in  which  the  event-allocating  body  is  less 
powerful (or has characteristics less adverse to Adelaide‟s α) and build up an event that will 
be accredited in time, as with the TDU and the AI3DE.  Finally Adelaide has focused on 
hosting niche international events such as the Police and Fire Games or trying to create its 
own attractions.  
A  problem  in  evaluating  the  alternative  strategies  and  assessing  the  power  of  the 
model developed above is that the public accounts do not provide information on how much 
was spent on specific events.  For example, the state budget for 1999/2000 included A$9.315 
million to fund major events such as the Tour Down Under, Tasting Australia, the Vermeer 
opera, and the World Solar Challenge; of this $650,000 was earmarked for the Clipsal 500, as 
part of a $1.45 million commitment over three years, but there is no further breakdown.  In 
2000/1 subsides were also provided to the Le Mans race.  In 2001/2 the Tour Down Under 
and the International Horse Trials are mentioned, but as in the previous years there is no 
breakdown, and much of the spending on events is hidden in the SA Tourism Commission 
(SATC)  budget.    In  the  2004/5  state  budget  the  Australian  Men‟s  Hard  Court  Tennis 
Championship  and  the  Great  Australian  Outback  Cattle  Drive  are  mentioned,  as  is  the 
ongoing dispute over claims related to the Le Mans race.  In 2006-7 money was earmarked 
for the IRB rugby sevens.  At best this provides a minimum list of which events received 
public financial support, but there may be events that are not specified and the annual budgets 
explicitly have a line for contingency funding for new events. 
The lack of data is consistent with our model's implication that lobby groups and 
politicians may value non-transparency.  No sporting event with significant SA government 
funding has readily available accounts.  Many expenditures are hidden in unexpected budget 
lines or are essentially off-budget in the consolidated accounts of public bodies such as the   21 
South  Australian  Tourism  Commission  (SATC).    Requests  for  access  under  Freedom  of 
Information acts are deflected by arguments about commercial sensitivity.  This obfuscation 
appears to be bipartisan in South Australia as both major parties follow the same pattern 
when  in  government  and,  when  governments  change,  do  not  disclose  details  of  their 
predecessors' finacial arrangements.   
Regardless of the availability of data, there is a case for a more thorough examination 
of the justification behind attempting to host or hosting on a perpetual basis these events.  Ex 
post studies show few gains, and in some cases (such as the Le Mans race) large losses.  
Given that success in bidding is uncertain, the desirability of directing public money to such a 
purpose is  questionable.   Our model and the observations from South Australia‟s bidding 
history raise questions about both the bid-making process when public money is involved, 




The issue of bidding for sports mega-events has been neglected in the literature, where the 
focus has been on comparisons between the ex ante purported economic benefits against 
measured  ex  post  net  benefits  for  cities  and  countries  who  have  hosted  events.    The 
economics of the bidding process itself justifies further research, especially as the number of 
rival  hosts  and  the  amounts  spent  on  bidding  are  on  the  rise.    Case  studies  from  South 
Australia  reveal  that  the  sums  involved  in  bidding  are  non-trivial,  and  at  times  non-
transparent.  There is much to be understood about the political economy of mega-event 
bidding  and  about  aspects  such  as  the  role  of  ex  ante  estimates  of  the  benefits  form  a 
successful bid.     
This paper examines one important aspect of the bidding process, namely the role of 
special interest groups. Our lobbying model reveals that lobby groups may be able to extract 
rents from the bidding process at the expense of general welfare of the public, and actively 
induce the government to make bids.    This application to sport builds upon  an impressive 
literature which demonstrates that special interests may sway policy outcomes in their favour, 
even when the general welfare effects are negative (see for example, Stigler, 1971; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1994).    
There is little doubt that some interest groups benefit from bidding for a major event 
whether the bid is successful or not, e.g. bidding expenditures often are heavily weighted 
towards marketing and benefit consulting firms or publicity agencies.  Moreover, it is likely   22 
that during the bidding process, the relevant sporting bodies at a regional or national level 
will  receive  government  funding,  which  may  cross-subsidize  their  normal  activities. 
Subsidised development of sporting stadia may be part of a bid irrespective of the bid‟s 
success,  e.g.  the  velodrome  built  as  part  of  Adelaide‟s bid  for  the  1998  Commonwealth 
Games or the soccer stadium upgrade to host soccer matches in the 2000 Olympic Games and 
stadium  expenditures  as  conditions  for  Adelaide  being  part  of  Australia‟s  bid  for  the 
2018/2022 World Cups.  Construction companies may support bids in the hope of current or 
future building contracts.  Hence, win or lose, these groups may lobby governments to bid for 
the event because they perceive positive benefits but typically do not bear any of the cost of 
bidding. 
This paper does not directly address the issue of ex ante estimates overstating the 
benefits from hosting events, although the model and case study are consistent with this 
extensive literature.  A further complication rests in one of the general purported benefits of 
hosting mega-events, that the event „will put the city on the map‟.
 Gratton et al (2006) argue 
that the economic perspective is too narrow a view of impact and recommend a “balanced 
scorecard” approach with four elements: economic impact, sports development, media and 
sponsor evaluation, and place marketing effects. Politicians (both incumbent and opposition) 
and in particular sporting associations and other groups standing to gain a significant benefit 
tend to adopt a high public profile in touting these less easily quantifiable arguments.  This 
„lobbying of the public‟ has been an under-researched area of public choice economics, and, 
given its prevalence in the context of sports policy, warrants further investigation.
36 South 
Australia is a prime example; e.g. in announcing Adelaide's bid for the 2006 Commonwealth 
Games, the Government cited market research making the following claim: 
“I  have  been  pleasantly  surprised  at  the  community  support.    Some  84%  of  the 
community supported the bid, but the best part of it is that 86% of people between the 
ages of 18 and 25 not only supported the bid, but believed that the Government should 
make a significant investment in obtaining the opportunity” (The Hon G. A. Ingerson, 
Parliamentary Debates SA 1994/95, page 1771). 
 
Such  a  claim,  despite  obvious  questions  as  to  whether  the  true  opportunity  costs  were 
revealed to respondents, is typical of the rhetoric of various public organisations proposing 
bids.  One possibility is that by fostering such favourable perceptions early in the process, 
there may be less scrutiny of government spending by the public.  Moreove, by directing 
                                                       
36 Yu (2005) is one notable exception  
   23 
attention to non-quantifiable benefits this process pre-empts criticism about over-stating the 
net public benefits of a successful bid..  More generally, this may be part of a pattern of 
obfuscation by which government and lobby groups hide the true costs and benefits of a bid 
which  benefits  these  groups  disproportionately  and  may  potentially  leave  the  tax-paying 
public with net costs. 
  Compounding the issue is that special interest groups which stand to gain from the 
bidding process itself or from winning the right to host are often not immediately observable 
by the public (at least before the event).  The case study of Adelaide is suggestive of path 
dependence  in  terms  of  hosting  major  events.    The  loss  of  an  event  may  indeed  see  a 
scramble to find substitutes.  At the same time the establishment of major event committees 
or rewarding bodies such as SATC for winning major events creates vested interests which 
will lobby for future events in order to maintain their status. 
While we have noted that South Australia has been a „serial bidder‟ for mega (and not 
so mega) events, we do not present this case study as something out of the ordinary.  Indeed, 
we suspect that many readers of this paper will  recognize some elements familiar in the 
context of their own countries.  The discussion has raised several questions relating to both 
the  process  itself  and  the  public  choice  aspects  of  sports  bidding,  which  we  believe  are 
applicable not just to sports mega-events, but also to other community events such as arts or 
food festivals and also to public policy decisions about subsidies for location of industries or 
about awarding of defence contracts.   24 
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Appendix - Proof of Results 
 
 
1.  Bidding 
 
The FOC in (5) is: 
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Evaluating at equilibrium yields results: 
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and that (1-)>0 and >0.  In 





, hence the 
numerator is negative.  The numerator in (R2) is positive (R>0). 







as discussed in the text.  The sign of (R4) 
depends  on  the  relative  costs  and  benefits  from  the  bid.    Specifically,  if  the  costs  are 











if costs are relatively low, the inequality is reversed. 
 
 
2.  Contributions 
 
The FOC in (6) is 
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Note that as: 
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.  This is discussed 
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.  Note the 
strict inequality for (R6) and (R7) where <1. 
 